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At first sight it might appear that M. Merleau-Ponty and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein are strange allies; for phenomenology and 
analytic philosophy have long been considered incompatible. 
However, greater insight into the similarities between the two 
philosophers will show that the phenomenology of Merleau-
Ponty is a foundation for a phenomenal world in which a 
Wittgensteinian philosophy may flourish, though not at the 
expense of that foundation, but to form a more complete and 
comprehensive philosophy. After such a synthesis of 
Wittgensteinian philosophy and Mer leau-Ponty ' s 
phenomenology of perception, where Wittgenstein grows silent, 
when we reach beyond the 'language-games' and 'forms of life,' 
once again the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty presents itself 
to point toward the Beyond. The precedence and succession of 
Merleau-Ponty to Wittgenstein is not a temporal or honorary 
one, but rather, a logical or phenomenological one. For 
Merleau-Ponty dares to tread where language fears to go; 
cannot go. While Wittgenstein has restricted himself to 
ordinary language, Merleau-Ponty has advocated the primacy 
of perception. Together, however, they find themselves 
"condemned to meaning."1 
It is precisely at the source of meaning that Merleau-Ponty 
constructs a foundation on which Wittgenstein can build. The 
foundation is phenomenologically prior to personal 
consciousness. Merleau-Ponty calls such a 'place' the 
'phenomenal field,' which is bounded by horizons that limit 
and structure its scope. There, in the phenomenal field that is 
pre-personal, pre-reflective, non-thematic, meaning occurs 
when the polarities of subject and object coincide. Only in 
several unique relationships is meaning possible. Without a 
I am grateful to Eward G. Lawry for his comments on earlier drafts of 
this essay. 
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subject, nothing exists; without an object, nothing exists. Both 
are mutually interdependent and inseparable. They are two 
polarities in a relationship out of which springs the vivacity 
that is being and the world. One cannot ask nor say 'where* the 
world was or how it existed prior to its perception, nor the same 
concerning any subject prior to the disclosure of the world to it. 
For one without the other is naught. As a rainbow appears as 
the manifestation of the intimacy of sunlight and rain, so 
being-in-the-world occurs as the only possible avenue to the 
intimacy of subject and world. Phenomenologically prior to the 
existence of that which is personal to utter an 'I,' before the 
consciousness experiences its own reflection, the body-subject (as 
Merleau-Ponty labels it) reaches out with a primitive openness 
to the world in the heart of the 'context' that is the 
phenomenal field, to grasp into itself the physiognomies that 
present themselves before the backgrounds that stand out from 
the phenomenal field and the horizon surrounding it. This is 
the first world of the trilogy presented by Merleau-Ponty. It is 
here, in the pre-personal world, that the primacy of perception 
gets established and the foundation for phenomenology is laid. 
For anterior to it one cannot penetrate, and posterior from it one 
cannot construct such a foundation, as the failures of empiricism 
and intellectualism have adequately shown.2 
It is indeed in this perceptual event that consciousness 
'happens' as perception in its quasi-teleological reach which 
intentionally extends to the object of perception, and 'means' it 
as it is itself 'meant' by that object. In that existential 
reciprocity, that polarity of perceiver and perceived, the 
consciousness is taunted, drawn, and seduced to meaning. 
Consciousness does not begin to exist until it sets limits to an 
object, and even the phantoms of 'internal experience' are 
possible only as things borrowed from external experience. 
Therefore consciousness has no private life, and the only obstacle 
it encounters is chaos, which is nothing.3 
2Gary Brent Madison, The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty: A 
Search for the Limits of Consciousness (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 1981), pp. 24-7. 
3Merleau-Ponty, pp. 27-28. 
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This limitation is not a constituting consciousness like that of 
Kant, but rather, a perceiving consciousness that attempts to 
define a horizon of meaning that forms the object of perception, 
which discloses itself as a physiognomy before a background. 
"The perceptual 'something' is always in the middle of 
something else, it always forms part of a 'field'."4 From this 
field surrounded by its horizon springs the background which 
presents a physiognomy to the intending perceptual 
consciousness. Because, in the phenomenal field 'this' side of 
the horizon, the background steps forth offering an object for 
perception that stands before such a background, meaning is 
made possible. For in perception, the 'space* between the 
perceiving consciousness and the physiognomy, the 
physiognomy and the background, and the background and the 
horizon is depth, which is an existential dimension.5 Those 
items, standing in such a relation to each other, create 
existential relations that are the 'meaning' of consciousness. 
Our perceptual field is made up of 'things' and 'spaces' between 
things!6 
The perceived world is structured according to the hold that body 
has or can have on it. The spatiality of the perceived world is thus 
a reply to the body's dimensions and its possibilities for action.7 
This makes the presence of the body-subject the 'here' as it 
stands in existential relation to the 'there' of the object of 
perception, which is made possible (to stand forth from) by the 
background and phenomenal field. Because this body-subject 
and object of perception are inseparable, they are in a unified 
polarity of 'here' and 'there' simultaneously. It can only follow 
that such a collapse of 'space' would place consciousness 
nowhere and everywhere. 
I am a consciousness, a strange creature which resides nowhere 
and can be everywhere present in intention. Everything that 
exists exists as a thing or as a consciousness, and there is no 
halfway house. The thing is in a place, but perception is nowhere. 
4Merleau-Ponty, p. 4. 
5Merleau-Ponty, p. 267. 
6Merleau-Ponty, p. 15. 
7Madison, p. 29. 
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. . Its incarnation furnishes no positive characteristic which has to 
be accounted for, and its thisness (ecceity) is simply its own 
ignorance of itself.8 
The 'here' of the body-subject is its presence in the world. The 
'here' is not a space in a geometrical system of relations, a 
euclidean space, but rather, an existential space, a dimension of 
meaning that takes place 'here.' 'Here' is the embodied or 
incarnate consciousness. Consciousness and the body are 
perceptually indistinguishable. This is the body-subject, that 
totality that is body and consciousness. This body-subject seen 
as the body image is the body that I live, perceive as, 'where' I 
am at 'home'. 
The phenomenal body is to be understood as an 'expressive 
unity', a synergic system, to be compared not to a physical object 
but to a work of art. It is the seat of intentionality, so that in 
projecting itself onto the world, it makes the world the arena for 
my intentions.9 
The body viewed merely as a physical object as in physiology 
is the objective body. However, I live and move my 
phenomenal (lived) body. It is what I reach from and through 
as I intend the object of my perceptions and receive that object 
from the world as it is meant to me. It is precisely this 
intentional relationship that is definitive of both body-subject 
and the world, and only in such a synthesis of those two 
polarities is the physiognomy of the world given to the body-
subject through sensation, and is the body cast into the object of 
perception which 'thinks itself in that subject. 1 0 Thus the 
world as the object of perception is for that perceiving subject, 
and that subject is for the world as being-in-the-world and as 
the possibility of the being of the object so perceived. 
Therefore the body-subject can only maintain its 'here' (i.e. 
position in the phenomenal field) as being-in-the-world if 
there is a world in which to be, and the world can only 'be' if 
8Merleau-Ponty, pp. 37-8. 
9 Laurie Spurling, Phenomenology and the Social World, The 
Philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and its relation to the social sciences 
(London: Routledge & Kcgan Paul, 1977), p. 22. 
1 0Madison. pp. 27-8. 
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there is a perceiving subject for which to be. That subject, 
however, can only 'be' to provide and therefore allow the being 
of the world if the world is 'there' to be perceived and thus 
grant being to the body-subject. Such a synthesis is not complete 
for even though the world and the body-subject are mutually 
dependent on each other, the world always outruns the subject's 
perception of it. Thus, it is the case that the above synthesis is 
only partial and contingent, not the coinciding of the subject 
with the world.1 1 As John O'Neil expresses it. 
We understand the world and the objects it presents to us in a 
level of symbiosis . . . To possess a body that is capable of 
innersensory synergy is to possess a universal setting or schema 
for all possible styles or typical structures in the natural world . . . 1 2 
Although this symbiosis exists with a single subject, it shall be 
assumed in this essay that there is a plurality of subjects each 
of which perceives the world. The world is an intersubjective 
perception; the world sustaining and creating the possibility 
for subjects and subjects for the world. Spurling explains. 
There is intersubjectivity because all experience opens into a 
common world. Experience understood phenomenologically, is 
essentially open: it blends with other experiences of mine to 
create structures and patterns, and blends with the experiences of 
other persons to create intersubjective meanings to found 
communication.13 
This is the basis for the social world which, like the 
phenomenal world, is primordial.14 It is the world of language. 
For without language there could exist no human world, no 
social world. There could be no intersubjectivity. All body-
subjects, if one can even say there would be such, would be 
"Albert Rabil, J. R., Merleau-Ponty: Existentialist of the Social World 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 32-5. 
1 2 John O'Neill, Perception, Expression and History, The Social 
Phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1970), p. 17. 
13Spurling, p. 41. 
1 4Rabil,p.36. 
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forever isolated and banished to rampant individualism and 
relativity to such singleness. O'Neil cogently points this out: 
Through language we first encounter that system of exchanges 
between consciousness and the world in which meaning is 
established and renewed in a permutation of the given and the 
possible which offers a paradigm of all cultural institutions, for it 
is the matrix of the acquisition and renewal of the tradition of 
humanity in each of us. 
Through language I discover myself and others, in talking, 
listening, reading, and writing. It is language which makes 
possible that aesthetic distance [depth] between myself and the 
world through which I can speak about the world and the world in 
turn can speak through me. Our thoughts and purposes are 
embodied in bodily gestures... and thus we make our world. 1 5 
The social or human world and even humankind itself is 
inconceivable without language. Language is the way one lives 
outside oneself in a symbolic world of meaning that is beyond 
the phenomenal world. There is nothing that illuminates the 
intersubjectivity of the world better than language. It reveals 
both one's individuality and the universality of life. Language 
surrounds us, engulfs us, permeates us. It is the existential 'air' 
that we breathe, move in, and live through. It sustains us, 
grounds us, and allows us to transcend ourselves to meaning that 
is above the pre-personal, phenomenal world. It is the very 
'Life' of the social world. 1 6 
In the second world of Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein makes 
his home. Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy precisely 
illuminates the intersubjective linguistic characteristic that is 
inherent in this social world. Because of the linguistic ties, and 
only so, is intersubjectivity possible, propagated and continuing. 
The interpermeation of language and subjectivity to 
intersubjectivity is much like that of the relation of perception 
and the object of perception. One without the other results in 
both being annihilated. They are mutually interdependent. 
Because the intersubjectivity of the social world is such, my 
perceptions of the phenomenal world can share with others the 
commonly held assumptions and expectations about the 
1 50 ,Neill,pp.61,64. 
16Madison, p. 121. 
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perceptual world. Like the phenomenal world, the 'linguistic 
world' is given to us prereflectively. "Language is a signifying 
system . . . something 'already there', something the members 
of a linguistic community have inherited and not constituted . . 
. " 1 7 It is the meaning that is given to us, intersubjectively, by 
the social (linguistic) world as meaning is given to us by the 
phenomenal world. This is, then, the appropriate starting 
point for a linguistic philosopher like Wittgenstein. Though it 
may seem strange to synthesize phenomenology and linguistic 
analysis, I shall attempt to show the ease with which such a 
synthesis is not only possible but naturally compatible with 
Merleau-Ponty's notion of this social world. Spurting has 
already testified to such. 
We see here a striking convergence with Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenology of speech - in Wittgenstein's stress on meaning 
as use in context, his analogy between words and tools, his 
rejection of meaning as an internal, mental activity, to say nothing 
of his definition of understanding in existential rather than 
conceptual terms, as the mastery of a technique, involving the 
ability to carry out what is intellectually grasped.1 8 
The above quotation clearly states an important point in 
this synthesis. For, existentially, Wittgenstein and Merleau-
Ponty are in the same dimension, though perhaps it must be 
granted that their respective techniques do vary. Wittgenstein 
begins by rejecting the nominalistic conception of language 
espoused by Augustine and a great many other philosophers 
that followed him. Language 'lives' for us in a variety of ways 
and cannot be simplistically contained in 'this' box.or 'that' 
one. As the object of perception 'outruns' the perception, so 
words 'outrun' our simple classification of how they exist for us. 
There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of 
what we call 'symbols', 'words', 'sentences'. And this multiplicity is 
not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language. 
17Madison, p. 121. 
18Spurling, p. 64. 
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new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and 
others become obsolete and get forgotten.19 
The fluidity of language is analogous to that of perceptual 
phenomena. As the perception of phenomena is meaningful 
only as it stands out from the background 'behind' it, and that 
background rises out of the phenomenal field 'this* side of the 
horizon, and meaning comes forth; so it is with language. For, 
as Wittgenstein correctly shows, meaning in the social 
(linguistic) world happens in the same fashion. Words and 
sentences (the phenomena of the social world) stand in a 
particular 'context', a linguistic field, that is also surrounded 
by a horizon that Wittgenstein will call 'rules' of 'grammar'. It 
is precisely this context and the given 'use' of a word that are 
the meaning of it, the use being roughly analogous to the 
'background' before which a word stands out. When a word is 
perceived one sees not only how it is 'used', i.e. which 
background against which it is displayed, but also the context 
of the use, i.e. where in the linguistic (analogously, 
phenomenal) field it occurs or stands out. If it were not used in a 
context provided by 'rules' (horizons of meaning) there could be 
no 'meaning' at all. For, mere jibberish would only result. As 
subject and the world without each other are annihilated, so 
speaker/listener and linguistic field without each other are 
nonexistant. 
Compare the following quotations from Wittgenstein and 
Merleau-Ponty, respectively: 
Though - one would like to say - every word has a different 
character in different contexts, at the same time there is one 
character it always has: a single physiognomy. It looks at us . 2 0 
Words have a physiognomy because we adopt towards them, as 
toward each person, a certain form of behavior which makes its 
complete appearance the moment each word is given. 2 1 
1 9 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing CO., Inc. 1958), sec. 23. 
20Wittgenstein, Investigations, p. 181. 
21Merleau-Ponty, pp. 235-6. 
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And compare the following from Merleau-Ponty and 
Wittgenstein, respectively: 
The word is . . . the presentation of a form of behavior of a 
linguistic act in its dynamic fullness.22 
Words are deeds. 2 3 
Though they are speaking from - can I say - 'different worlds', 
the similarity and compatibility of the two methods is 
'phenomenal'. The way words, sentences, are the phenomena of 
the linguistic world and are therefore the deeds of humans that 
make up such a social world, by the agreement of both 
philosophers, will later prove an important characteristic of 
the liaison between the phenomenal world of Merleau-Ponty 
and the social-linguistic world of Wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein, in one of the above quotations, mentioned the 
term 'language-games', which is a fundamental notion of his 
linguistic philosophy;".. . in one sense Wittgenstein's analysis 
can be seen as a refinement of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, 
namely, in his notion of language-games, his view of language 
as a variety of interlocking parts." 2 4 The language-game for 
him is roughly equivalent to the 'here' of Merleau-Ponty. As 
the place of the body-subject makes up a non-geometrical, lived 
space, so the speaker/listener has a 'here*. It is the language-
game in which he lives, 'where' he is at 'now'. The 'here' of 
the body-subject is 'wherever' the body-subject occurs; so it is 
with the language-game. It is 'wherever' the speaker is 
'playing'. It determines its place and does not invent itself into 
an already objectified schema. 
As the body-subject is always in relation to the 'there,' the 
speaker is always, from his 'here*, in relation to a 'there' 
which is ultimately other language-games in which he is at 
the moment not participating. As the body-subject can take his 
'here' to a 'there' and that 'there' becomes his 'here,' so the 
speaker can change games, and play another. He is not confined 
^Merleau-Ponty, pp. 236. 
^Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 46e. 
24Spurling, p. 64. 
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to any given place in the linguistic field which he inhabits. 
Wittgenstein said, "You must bear in mind that the language-
game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not 
based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is 
there - like our life." 2 5 
As the motility of the body-subject is non-rational and a 
'way of life' or way of 'being-in-the-world', so the language-
game is a way of 'being-in-the-linguistic-world.' However, 
there is the distinction between 'that' (the fact that) there is 
'being-in-the-world' and 'how' (the way) there is being-in-
the-world.' Where the subject occurs in the linguistic and 
phenomenal worlds is 'here.' But the 'way' being-in-the-world 
(linguistic) is 'here' is a 'form of life.' The way we are in. the 
social world is linguistically. F o r , " . . . to imagine a language 
means to imagine a form of life."2 6 As Wittgenstein later says, 
"Here the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into 
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an 
activity, or of a form of life." 2 7 
One further point of continuity and similarity between the 
two philosophers is Merleau-Ponty's notion of 'horizons of 
meaning,' and Wittgenstein's notion of 'rules/ as noted earlier 
above. Merleau-Ponty's notion of horizons of meaning whether 
as an 'inner' horizon or 'outer' horizon is comparable to 
Wittgenstein's 'rules' because both concepts are boundaries that 
give the structure, outline and therefore the context of meaning 
to the basic components of the world of each: 'phenomena' and 
'phenomenal field' in the former, 'words,' 'sentences' and 
'games' in the latter. For Merleau-Ponty the inner horizon is 
that which separates the object of perception from the 
background and ultimately the phenomenal field. The outer 
horizon is that which bounds the phenomenal field itself. 
Likewise, for Wittgenstein 'rules' or the grammar' of language-
games is what separates and distinguishes words and sentence 
and context in 'this' game from other games, or what gives it 
the characteristic of being like or similar to another game with 
which it has a 'family resemblance.' Obviously, the 'grammar' 
of language as such is the perimeter of language or the 
^Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty (New York: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1969), sec. 559. 
26Wittgenstein, Investigations, sec. 19. 
27Wittgenstein, Investigations, sec. 23. 
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linguistic field. One cannot 'sec' a horizon or beyond it, 
literally or existentially. Therefore, one 'blindly' - so to say -
stays within the boundaries that are 'there.' The rules that 
make up those horizons are not written down, but are blurred 
concepts that one operates without thinking. 2 8 The above 
similarities between these two worlds reveal the existential 
compatibility and parallel of the two philosophies and worlds 
which they inhabit. 
Perhaps the further question can be raised, and essentially 
so, concerning the junction of the social (linguistic) and 
phenomenal (pre-personal) worlds. It has already been stated 
that the phenomenal world is prior to the social world which 
is prior to the objective. Both philosophers see the latter as 
the ontologically least important and epistemologically most 
dependent world. The objective rests on the social and the 
phenomenal. So we should ask, 'where' is it that a junction of 
the first two worlds occurs? Perhaps the clearest way to 
approach such a question is to ask how far does Wittgenstein 
regress to his most fundamental point or foundation? 
Wittgenstein blatantly states the most primitive retreat 
available to him in the 'social/linguistic' world: "If I have 
exhausted the justification I have reached bedrock and my 
spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply 
what I do'." 2 9 Prior to that point Wittgenstein cannot go with 
the criteria he has laid down. Obviously, he seems to 'jump in' 
at the center of the worlds, and perhaps he could be criticized 
for so limited a description of his foundation. However, it 
should be remembered that, working within a linguistic 
context, that is all he 'needs' to do. For he has assumed that 
human convention is as far as one can go in justifying human 
behavior of which language is an intricate part. Wittgenstein 
is not, clearly, denying any antecedent event or faculty to 
human convention, only saying that he does not know what it 
would be, and frankly, for his purposes it is irrelevant. How we 
perceive at the pre-personal level or even if we do is of no 
consequence to his position. How, for example, we obtained, 
created, etc., the capacity for language and language itself is of 
complete indifference. Wittgenstein needs no prior explanation 
^Wittgenstein, Investigations, sec. 219. 
^Wittgenstein, Investigations, sec. 217. 
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or justification to accomplish what he does. A further 
explanation, as given by Merleau-Ponty, is indeed interesting 
and informative, but still entirely compatible with 
Wittgenstein's version of the social world. So, Wittgenstein is 
comfortable with the human deed as his foundation. However, 
at times he does seem to hint at something prior: "The origin 
and the primitive form of the language-game is a creation. 
Only from this can more complicated forms develop. Language -
I want to say - is a refinement, 'in the beginning was the 
deed'." 3 0 
Wittgenstein sometimes encourages the reader to stop 
'thinking' (i.e. intellectualizing) and look at the situation, or 
work, or game, etc. At these times he sounds very close to a 
Merleau-Pontian phenomenology in that he is surpassing an 
intellectual analysis in behalf of a perceptual or at least a 
prior 'something.' In two different works, for example, he says: 
"- but look and see... To repeat: don't think, but look!"3 1 And 
again: "God grant the philosopher insight to what lies in front 
of everyone's eyes." 3 2 So, though Wittgenstein maintains 'that 
is what I do' as his foundation, certainly he leaves the door 
open for others to continue. Through that door Merleau-Ponty 
'intentionally' strides toward what lies beyond it, namely the 
phenomenal world. 
That is not to say that Merleau-Ponty does not place a great 
deal of importance on the social world, for the converse is true. 
In fact, without the social world, we could not even 'talk' about 
the phenomenal one. It would be banished from us, and it is 
impossible to see how any person could conceive of the pre-
personal without the social institution of language. How could 
one conceive of that which is prior to that which one never 
knew or perceived? In that sense, then, the social world is 
before us and necessary for 'us.' Merleau-Ponty beautifully 
explains: 
We must therefore rediscover... the social world, not as an object 
or sum of objects, but as a permanent field or dimension of 
existence: I may well turn away from it, but not cease to be 
situated relatively to it. Our relationship to the social is, like our 
^Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 31e. 
3 1 Wittgenstein, Investigations, sec. 66. 
32Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p. 63e. 
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relationship to the world, deeper than any express perception of 
any judgment . . . We must return to the social with which we 
carry about inseparably with us before any objectification . . . The 
social is already there when we come to know or judge it. 3 3 
Merleau-Ponty in the above quotation is certainly saying 
the same as Wittgenstein, and more. Both men undeniably see 
the social world as one of great existential importance. 
Merleau-Ponty has stated that we cannot get completely away 
from it, for it is deeper than any single perception alone. On 
the basis of the phenomenal world the social must rest, for 
Merleau-Ponty. However, both are intimately tied together. 
As shown in the above discussion of the phenomenal world, it is 
prior to the possibility for social experience. If one never has a 
perception, then one could never have a social world at all. 
Only from perception does it follow that there is a world, 
natural, social or otherwise. Only because there is perception 
can one know of the existence of other selves, language, etc. So 
perception and therefore the phenomenal world is of primary 
importance to ground any world. 
Another truly interesting thing that both philosophers 
agree upon is that for their respective foundations to be 
foundations at all, each must admit that one can only 
acknowledge, believe, or have faith in it as the foundation on 
which to build. True, there may be good rational, phenomenal, 
or existential reasons to build upon 'that' one, but ultimately 
one has to admit to the 'fai thing' or mere 'acknowledging' of 
such a point of origin. Although Merleau-Ponty is much clearer 
and more straightforward in his 'confession of faith,' 
Wittgenstein is equally in agreement, using only different 
words and phrases. Merleau-Ponty writes: 
In experiencing a perceived truth, I assume that the concordance 
so far experienced would hold for a more detailed observation, I 
place my confidence in the world. Perceiving is pinning one's 
faith, at a stroke, in a whole future of experiences, and doing so in 
a present which never strictly guarantees the future; it is placing 
one's belief in a world.3 4 
^Merleau-Ponty, p. 362. 
^Merleau-Ponty, p. 297. 
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Such a 'faith' is 'automatic* for without this confidence in the 
world and the experiences it makes possible, humankind would 
be hopelessly lost in a kaleidoscopic chaos of so-called 
'perception* of a so-called 'world' by a so-called 'consciousness.' 
Taken a step further one could not use such words meaningfully -
for 'where* are the 'rules'? - or perhaps one could not even have 
those words or the concepts associated with them. 
Wittgenstein would certainly agree here. Although his 
admission is a bit more vague than Merleau-Ponty's, if he truly 
believes that justification must end with 'that is what I do,' 
then he must believe in it and in what, if anything, lies prior to 
it. He already admitted that rational explanation and 
conceptual analysis could take him no further. Therefore, it is 
quite easy to see why Wittgenstein harbors a fierce belief in 
the 'agreement' by humans. In Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics 3 5 he speaks of the agreement of humans in what 
they 'do'; one of these things being language. Without faith or 
belief in the regularity and consistency of human conventions, 
Wittgenstein's concepts of 'language-games' and 'forms of life' 
would be undermined. However, those statements that do 
imply his confession still remain vague and sparse: "My life 
consists in my being content to accept many things." 3 6 
Wittgenstein discloses his belief in human 'deeds' by words 
like: 'accept,' 'agreement,' 'acknowledgement' (i.e. acceptance 
of - not admitting knowledge). Wittgenstein, like Merleau-
Ponty, then, goes to his foundation only to believe in and beyond 
it. 'Believing' is just what they must 'do.* 
The above paragraphs show the incredible similarities 
between Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein. From their point of 
junction, i.e. of the phenomenal and social worlds, through the 
parallels of their philosophies in those worlds, they share 
many of the same concepts, though each man says them 
differently. However, if Merleau-Ponty precedes Wittgenstein 
and the social world with his notion of perception and the 
phenomenal world, can he go beyond Wittgenstein, i.e. after 
the social world - not linearly, for that is the objective world, 
but rather, existentially? The phenomenal world is 
'descriptively' prior to the social and the social to the 
3 5Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1978) pp. 343-4, sec. 39. 
^Wittgenstein, On Certainty, sec. 344. 
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objective. Merleau-Ponty, however, could take the final 
'truths' of Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy and expand or 
broaden them. If we assume, as I shall for the sake of this 
essay, that absolute truth is the final at least existential, end 
or greatest end of life, then Merleau-Ponty indeed can transcend 
Wittgenstein's 'contexts' of language-games and forms of life to 
the 'context of contexts'. Unfortunately, Wittgenstein does not 
in the end offer a means of, or even grant the possibility of, 
uniting all of the truths of language-games into the 'truth of 
(particular) truths'. Many language-games may have 'family 
resemblance' as games of sports have similarities (e.g. soccer, 
football, baseball, tennis, and golf are all games that use some 
kind of a ball), but Wittgenstein intentionally chose the term 
'game' for his notions because there is no one characteristic that 
is common to all games. We still know what a game is and how 
to use the word, but we cannot find a single characteristic that 
every game possesses: "I am saying that phenomena have no 
one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, -
but that they are related to one another in many different 
ways." 3 7 Indeed, they are related, but they cannot be united in 
a single context. 
Merleau-Ponty, on the contrary, speaks of a notion that is 
like a 'context of contexts'. This, however, could not be the 
object of consciousness, because to be such would require the 
body-subject to 'be' outside the world to perceive it. If, then, 
this unity of truth, the 'context of contexts,' is absolute truth in 
some sense, it can never be known. Indeed, this meshing of the 
truths of particular language-games or of forms of life is 
interesting and perhaps even desirable. I am not, however, 
convinced that it can be more than hopeful speculation on the 
part of Merleau-Ponty. If it cannot be perceived, because that 
would violate the basis of perception in requiring the body-
subject to be being-OMfsirfe-the-world, then there is no rational, 
linguistic or phenomenal basis on which to assume such. If 
Merleau-Ponty can provide a way to support this 
transcendental context, so be it. This, however, would be in 
Wittgensteinian terms a 'game of games' and therefore would 
be the characteristic that unites all of the games into this new 
game. That would undermine the very notion of 'game' that 
37Wittgenstein, Investigations, sec. 65. 
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Wittgenstein is working with in the concept of 'language-
games', which is foundational for the social world as he 
interprets it. For any particular game is grounded in 'rules' that 
one follows - as it were - 'blindly' (comparable to Merleau-
Ponty's 'inner horizon'). The 'rules* or 'grammar' of the 'game* 
of all language-games would force them to share that grammar 
in common. Therefore, the entire parallelism drawn in this 
essay between the phenomenological Merleau-Ponty and the 
linguistic Wittgenstein is irreparably shattered into infinity, 
and their compatibility is a gross illusion. 
However, such is not the case. Merleau-Ponty cannot prove 
the existence of a 'context of contexts', but may only 
speculatively posit that possibility to lend existential benefits 
to the world and the subjects that greet it. In fact, Merleau-
Ponty's position seems to be far closer to Wittgenstein's than one 
might at first imagine. Merleau-Ponty's notion of 'context of 
contexts' perhaps could more accurately be interpreted as an 
elaborate system of 'family resemblances'. There may be many 
resemblances, similarities, or relations, but the absolute will 
never be reached. In that sense there 'is' no 'context of contexts.' 
Spurling explains: 
Self-understanding can never be total. This is what Merleau-
Ponty means when he [ s a y s ] . . . 'truth is always to come'. Truth 
never completely arrives because it can never be absolute and 
eternal. And so, for phenomenology . . . there can only be a truth 
within a situation: 'And since we have an idea of truth, since we 
are in truth and cannot escape it, the only thing left for me to do is 
to define a truth in the situation.38 
As Wittgenstein will say that what counts as the truth in any 
given situation depends on the language-game one is playing, so 
Merleau-Ponty has situational-relative truths. Phenomenally 
as well as linguistically one can only speak of truths in relation 
to the background, field, horizon or language-game, 
respectively. To posit more is to step beyond what the world 
presents us in perception or human convention reveals to us in 
what we 'do'. As long as the 'context of contexts' is never 
reached, this absolute truth - if you will - remains antipodal to 
the horizon of meaning, and the above synthesis of Merleau-
^purling, p. 105. 
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Ponty and Wittgenstein can survive. The realization of such a 
context would not only obliterate the above synthesis, but 
perhaps their respective philosophical positions as well, if it 
were 'true'. 
Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty both are doing a 
descriptive philosophy as opposed to an explicatory one. 
Spurling claims that, "It is this opposition to any form of 
explanation, . . . which makes Wittgenstein's later philosophy 
in many ways comparable to phenomenology."39 Yet it would be 
a mistake and an oversimplification of Wittgensteinian 
philosophy to read him as merely or exclusively descriptive. 
This is a claim that may be true of his followers and those who 
are influenced by his philosophy, but to read Wittgenstein 
himself so would distort his existential 'depth'. For 
"Wittgenstein can be read from a transcendental or a 
descriptive perspective . . ." 4 0 Some will go on to declare as 
Spurling, in the above quote, that one must interpret 
Wittgenstein as one or the other, transcendental or descriptive. 
This is simply to construct a false dichotomy. One theme of 
this essay has been an attempt to read Wittgenstein as both 
descriptive (as most radical Wittgensteinians agree) and 
transcendental (as synthetic with phenomenology, especially 
Merleau-Ponty). Wittgenstein has been criticized by 
phenomenologists for striving for complete clarity. 4 1 That does 
not mean that he believes it is any more reachable than 
Merleau-Ponty's absolute truth - 'context of contexts'. If one can 
see Wittgenstein's ideas from perhaps a 'non-Anglo' 
perspective, and 'return to the Continent', then it will be clear 
that he is speaking descriptively and transcendentally. One 
will then see the existential and even phenomenological 
aspects of Wittgensteinian philosophy. 
The synthesis above shows quite clearly that Merleau-
Ponty precedes Wittgenstein descriptively and logically and 
that only on the basis of a transcendental assumption can he 
succeed Wittgenstein, go beyond. Existentially, this succession 
is important for it points being-in-the-world toward a goal, 
toward that ultimate 'context'. Wittgenstein, however, has no 
^Spurling, p. 176. 
^Spurling, p. 177. 
41Spurling, pp. 177-8. 
36 AUSLEGUNG 
place to point toward or goal to point at - existentially. Life is 
what we 'do', which is based on the phenomenal world, but it 
strives to no ultimate goals and it is difficult to see how any 
such goal could be useful, save existentially. Merleau-Ponty 
agrees with this grounding in deeds or action for he says: "'My 
life', my 'total being* are not dubious constructs, . . . b u t 
phenomena which are indubitably revealed to reflection. It is 
simply a question of what we are doing."42 This clearly shows 
the existential dependence of the two worlds as represented by 
Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein. The social world could not 
'exist' without the phenomenal in which it is grounded, and 
the phenomenal, if never known by 'us' and never 'spoken' of 
would be secluded and segregated in an existential isolation 
that is caged in the perception of single consciousness - however 
many there may be. Depending on whether one stands on 'this' 
side or 'that', on the one hand the transcendentally parallel 
worlds are given with the phenomenal world as the 
'background' for the social, and on the other the social world is 
the 'background' for the phenomenal. The latter may indeed be 
logically prior, but both forever remain - existentially -
mutually dependent. Therefore, the first world of Merleau-
Ponty is prior and parallel to the social world of Wittgenstein, 
and these are not existing as either/or, but rather as both/and. 
They together remain forever 'condemned to meaning'. 
42Merleau-Ponty, p. 380. 
